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ABSTRACT
This paper describes Emergency Information Systems (EIS) used by a
utility during the Year 2000 rollover. The systems are analyzed with respect to
the literature and lessons learned are discussed. Several factors are identified
that impact the design and effectiveness of these systems. These factors are
generalized to the overall design and management of current Emergency Systems.
Of particular interest are the findings related to integration of EIS from different
organizations and the difficulties that were encountered. Additional findings
with respect to training, common nomenclature, and organizational turf needs
are also discussed.

INTRODUCTION
Emergency Information Systems (EIS)
are used by organizations to assist in
responding to a crisis or disaster situation.
These systems support communications, data
gathering and analysis, and decision-making.
EIS are rarely used but when needed, must
function well and without fail. Designing and
building these systems requires designers to
anticipate what will be needed, what resources
will be available, and how conditions will
differ from normal. A standard model for an
EIS is from Bellardo, Karwan and Wallace
(1984) and identifies the components as
including a database, data analysis capability,
normative models, and an interface. This

model is only somewhat useful as it fails to
address issues such as how the EIS fits into the
overall
disaster
response
plan,
EIS
infrastructure, multiple organization spanning,
and integrating multiple systems. Additionally,
many organizations do not address the need
for an EIS until a disaster happens, and then,
only for a few months until something more
pressing comes up (Jennex 2003). The result
is that many organizations have an EIS that
may not be adequate.
The purpose of this paper is to look at
the use of EIS for the Year 2000 (Y2K)
rollover and to generalize lessons learned to
the building of future EIS. While the rollover
to the year 2000 proceeded with few problems,
organizations all over the world were prepared
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for disaster. What makes studying Y2K
interesting is that as a scheduled disaster,
organizations had time to prepare to respond.
This paper discusses how a utility in the
United States prepared and implemented their
EIS for the rollover. Many lessons pertaining
to the design and implementation of EIS were
learned and will be presented. It should be
noted that much of the data used in this paper
was collected by the author in his role as
project manager responsible for Y2K
contingency planning for this utility. The
author was personally responsible for
designing and implementing the EIS and
participated in one of the emergency centers
activated for Y2K. Another note is that Y2K
actually consisted of two rollovers, the
December 32 to January 1 and the February 28
to February 29 rollovers. The first rollover
went so well that little adjustment was made
for the second rollover. This rollover occurred
with even fewer events then the first and is
mentioned here only for completeness.
How generalizeable are these lessons?
It can be argued that with Y2K being a
planned and scheduled emergency it is not
representative of a real emergency. While that
is acknowledged it is also argued that real
emergencies are planned and many are
somewhat scheduled. For instance it is known
that there will be earthquakes and brush fires
in southern California so officials prepare an
EIS to respond to these events. Also, while
earthquakes are not predictable, brush fires
tend to happen during fire season making these
somewhat predictable events. The same can
be said for hurricanes and tornados, both tend
to occur during specific seasons making both
somewhat predictable. For these reasons,
lessons learned from Y2K with respect to
designing and implementing an EIS are
considered relevant and generalizeable to all
emergencies.

BACKGROUND
Emergency Information Systems
Emergencies and disasters are high
stress situations that require organizations to
respond in a manner that is different from their
normal operating procedures (Turoff 2002).
Patton and Flin (1999) discuss these stresses
on emergency managers and how to reduce
them. Disaster stressors, in addition to fatigue,
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CONTRIBUTIONS
This paper contributes to the IS
community by providing an in depth view of
Emergency Information Systems developed
for the Year 2000 response in the United
States Utility industry. This is a very
appropriate event to look at, as the response
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks is very similar
to the government response to Y2K. The
paper explores the design of EIS
implemented for the rollover and pays
particular attention to the training and drills
that were done to prepare emergency
response teams.
Additionally, issues
surrounding EIS integration are discussed
and analyzed. The paper concludes that
lessons learned during the Y2K experience
are very viable today. The audience for this
paper is expected to those studying or
performing the design and implementation
of emergency response systems.
include dealing with a complex, unpredictable
and dynamic response, time pressure,
communications, dealing with the media, and
operating within an integrated emergency
management context. To reduce these stresses,
disaster response plans should be based on
operational demands, tested regularly, and
have resources allocated. These plans should
not be based on implicit and untested
assumptions that reflect routine operational
requirements and conditions as plans based on
assumed capabilities are less effective than
anticipated and will increase ad hoc demands
on managers. Working in teams is required
during emergencies and having a well trained,
experienced team will reduce the impact of
team dynamic stressor. Additionally, disasters
require inter agency coordination and dealing
with interagency conflict and terminology
increases stress. These stresses can be reduced
if these agencies are integrated in their
response and participants train together so that
they are familiar with each other and
comfortable with the integrated disaster
response plan.
Finally, communication
systems are necessary for getting the right
information to the right people, but they will
not reduce stress unless participants are trained
and practiced in their use.
In addition to the stresses identified by
Patton and Flin (1999), Bellardo, Karwan and
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Wallace (1984) identifies the stress of
decision-making during disaster response and
recommends the creation of an EIS to assist
decision makers. The components of the EIS,
as suggested by Bellardo, Karwan and Wallace
(1984), were previously mentioned but several
researchers have looked at decision stress and
address methods for decreasing this stress.

with the name/ID and time entered of the
person entering the data. Finally, online
communities of experts should be utilized to
assist with the emergency.

Turoff (2002) expands the discussion
on stressors by discussing the philosophy of
the United States Office of Emergency
Preparedness. Key points of this philosophy
are:

•

The urgency in a disaster require that as
much relevant information for resolving
the disaster be gathered and stored prior to
the disaster

•

An EIS not used regularly won’t be used
in an actual emergency

•

•

Disaster information processing should be
case based with lessons learned from
previous disasters used to build new cases

People in emergencies don’t have time to
deal with issues not related to the
emergency

•

•

To minimize stress the response processes
and workflows should be as automated as
possible

Learning what actually happened is
extremely important to improving
emergency response performance

•

It is difficult to predict exactly who will
do what during an emergency

•

The crucial problem of the moment drives
the allocation of resources

•

Roles can be planned but whoever steps
into a role at any given moment defies the
attempt to prescribe behavior

•

Need to have confidence in the currency
and accuracy of the information provided

•

Exceptions to the planned behavior are
crucial factors in determining minute to
minute operations

•

Crisis situations require large numbers of
individuals to share information without
causing information overload

•

Exact actions and responsibilities of
individuals cannot be predetermined due
to unforeseen events occurring during the
crisis

To improve the EIS Turoff (2002)
suggests having multiple templates for a
variety of actions that can be modified as
needed. These templates should be able to be
used by individuals initiating notifications
using Personal Data Assistants (PDAs).
Additionally, these notifications should be
self-organizing and all entered data tagged

Lee and Bui (2000) studied the Kobe,
Japan earthquake disaster response and also
propose using a template based EIS. However,
they observed that:

Andersen, Garde and Andersen (1998)
investigated the use of Lotus Notes as a
form/template driven EIS and identified
several potential communication problems:
•

A sequence of messages from one
organizational unit to another is
misunderstood due to the initial message
not being opened or lost

•

A command is misinterpreted as
information (and not recognized as a
command) by the receiver due to grammar
issues

•

Decision makers and other personnel at
emergency response centers are
overwhelmed by bookkeeping while
keeping track of responses to commands
and messages

•

The meaning of a message is
misunderstood when the message is not
seen in the context of other messages to
which it is related

•

Even though the emergency plan is well
known there are still delays in
communicating alarms and commands to
relevant organizations and getting
responses

Fischer
(1998)
discussed
the
application of new technologies to emergency
mitigation, response, and recovery and
observed some issues associated with the
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technology used in an EIS. These issues
include information overload, loss of
information, retention of outdated information,
the greater likelihood of the diffusion of
inappropriate information, further diminution
of non-verbal communication, and the
inevitability of computer failures.
To improve the effectiveness of an EIS
and the emergency response team several
researchers recommend training (Patton and
Flin 1999; Turoff 2002, Andersen, Garde, and
Andersen 1998; Lee and Bui 2000; Fischer
1998; Renaud and Phillips 2003). Patton and
Flin (1999) found that training exercises and
simulations must test assumptions and
examine procedural and conceptual issues to
ensure the EIS and emergency response
processes will work when needed. Fischer
(1998) proposes the use of distance learning
technologies to ensure distributed emergency
response teams are trained. Turoff (2002)
discusses how an EIS that isn’t normally used
won’t be used in an emergency.
Others suggest modifications and/or
additions to the EIS. Fischer (1998) advocates
using technologies such as CD/DVD based
storage media, Web/Internet sites as a
common infrastructure providing access for
disaster response teams distributed across
multiple locations/organizations, and e-mail
for improving communications. Gheorghe and
Vamanu (2001) suggest adding Geographical
Information System (GIS) and satellite
capabilities to the EIS. Nisha de Silva (2001)
expands on using GIS to aid decision-making
during emergencies but warns of integration
difficulties with other technologies. Gadomski,
Bologna, Costanzo, Perini and Schaerf (2001)
discuss using case based reasoning, artificial
intelligence and intelligent agents to aid
decision makers during an emergency. They
believe real time operational data; decision
makers need data from operational systems,
and a user-friendly interface.
Finally, as a response to possible loss of
the EIS infrastructure, Renaud and Phillips
(2003) discuss the creation of Infrastructure
Continuity Plans for Infrastructure Continuity
Units (usually buildings). These were created
for Y2K and incorporated detailed equipment
information, data on failures, and detailed
response procedures.
This effort was
coordinated across the Public Works and
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Government Services of Canada and is being
evaluated for application by commercial
organizations.
Expanded EIS Model
To summarize, an EIS is more than the
basic components of database, data analysis,
normative models, and interface outlined by
Bellardo, Karwan and Wallace (1984). A
more complete EIS model includes these basic
components plus trained users (where users are
personnel using the EIS to respond to or
communicate about the emergency using the
EIS), methods to communicate between users
and between users and data sources, protocols
to facilitate communication, and processes and
procedures used to guide the response to and
improve decision making during the
emergency. The goals of the EIS are to
facilitate clear communications, improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of decisionmaking, and manage data to prevent or at least
mitigate information overload. EIS designers
use technology and work flow analysis to
improve EIS performance in achieving these
goals. It was this expanded EIS model that
was used by the subject utility to design their
Y2K EIS.
Year 2000 Problem Definition
The Y2K problem was caused by the
use of 2 digits to represent the year in a date.
It was called Y2K because the 2 digit year
only became a problem when the date rolled
into the year 2000 as computers assumed the 2
digit dates represented a 1900s date. Initial
surveys of software found wide-spread use of
the 2 digit date representation leading to fears
that calculations using these dates in the year
2000 would cause their algorithms to fail,
leading to computer and system failures. To
illustrate the pervasiveness of the Y2K
problem the subject utility found that
approximately 80% of its roughly 600,000
embedded systems or components (embedded
systems or components are systems or devices
that use pre-programmed devices to monitor,
control, and/or supervise processes) were date
sensitive (used or included dates). It was this
pervasiveness of date sensitive software and
hardware that led to the common perception
that Y2K could cause widespread system
failures leading to the disruption of critical
infrastructure such as communications,
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electricity, financial, transportation, and
medical systems/facilities. This paper deals
only with how the electrical utility dealt with
this issue.
Electric power system testing at the
onset of Y2K preparations demonstrated
clearly that the failure to remediate equipment
would likely have caused operational problems.
These problems would have increased the risk
of interruptions of electricity supply and
delivery (Cauley and Roth 2000). Some
examples of problems found preparing utilities
for Y2K included:
•

Distributed Control Systems (DCS) in
modern, non-nuclear power generating
plants in some cases displayed date
manipulation problems that locked up
programs and would have resulted in unit
shutdown.

•

Computer controller BIOS operating
system failures.

•

Alarm annunciator systems problems.

•

Client server hardware and software

•

UNIX operating systems

•

PC hardware, software, and operating
systems

•

Network management software

•

PBX’s – some require remediation

•

Miscellaneous digital controllers

•

Substation programmable controllers
some required repairs.

YEAR 2000 AND UTILITIES
The smooth transition to January 1,
2000 was not an indication of the seriousness
of Y2K or of the amount of work and
preparation that utilities expended. Since
electrical utilities are a key component of
civilization’s infrastructure, it was considered
prudent that a system should be in place to
immediately respond should Y2K cause
disruption to the electric grid.
It was
recognized that electric system failures could
have had substantial impact on the health and
safety of the general population, business
continuity across all sectors of the economy,
and national security. As a result, even though

all major utilities were reported ready prior to
the rollover (NRC 1999; Cauley and Roth
2000), preparations were made for major
disruptions should they occur. These plans
included contingency planning for loss of
components, systems, and plants and the
preparation for emergency staffing including
the activation of emergency response centers
and emergency information systems.

Y2K ROLLOVER PREPARATION
Each utility was responsible for
preparing for Y2K with oversight provided by
North American Reliability Council (NERC)
the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), the Nuclear Energy
Institute (NEI), and the Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI). Utilities spent 1998
assessing and remediating Y2K susceptible
components and systems. 1999 was dedicated
to preparing for the Y2K event. Preparations
consisted of three phases. The first phase was
the planning and design of EIS’s and
contingency plans. The second phase was
training and practice and generation of the
rollover event plans, and the third phase was
implementation and the Y2K event. The Y2K
event was also divided into phases. The first
phase was EIS activation and early warning
monitoring (for utilities in North America).
The second phase was the rollover itself, and
the third phase was post rollover validation
and recovery.
Additionally, plans were
generated for the leap year rollover in 2000 as
this was thought to also be a potential problem.
This paper will discuss the EIS preparation
phases by discussing the EIS’s generated in
phase 1, the drills, training, and plans
generated in phase 2, and an analysis of how
things went in phase 3. The rollover event
phases will be discussed by discussing the
EIS’s used in each event phase and analyzing
how well they worked.

Y2K EMERGENCY INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
Due to public concern there were many
organizations involved in Y2K. Utilities, in
addition to their own emergency response
centers and EIS, needed to work with NERC,
the United States NRC who also acted for the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
various federal and local regulatory agencies,
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NEI, and EPRI. All of these organizations had
emergency response centers and an EIS. Some
of these organizations tended to focus on
emergency response and an EIS during
specific rollover event phases: early warning
EIS, rollover event EIS, and post rollover
validation EIS. EIS from other organizations
were used by utilities for specific rollover
event phases although the EIS wasn’t
specifically designed for that purpose. These
systems are discussed below.
Early Warning EIS
The concept of early warning was that
as the rollover progressed around the world,
information from earlier time zones could be
used to prepare response in later time zones.
The subject utility used four early warning
systems in addition to monitoring other early
warning information brokers. Three of these
systems were designed specifically for early
warning while the fourth was designed as a
total rollover event EIS.
EPRI Early Warning System
The EPRI early warning system was a
password
protected,
Internet-based
information collection system. The system
provided general users a color-coded status
screen for various types of systems, regions, or
vendors identified by contributors as being
critical or susceptible. Details for each status
window were obtained by clicking on the
status window.
Contributors input status
through a series of input screens. Input
screens were based on standard templates and
utilized standard terminology that had been
predetermined by utilities using the EIS to
monitor the effects of rollover for early
indication of problems. Additionally, EPRI
provided a database of plant equipment with
test results and findings that could be used to
trouble shoot equipment failures should they
occur. The key to this system was the
identification of critical equipment by users
prior to Y2K, this allowed EPRI to locate
plants with this equipment for monitoring
during Y2K.
Users were prepared to operate the
system through the creation of a training and
user manual that was provided upon request.
Additionally, hands-on user training was
provided in October 1999 at an EPRI Y2K
user group meeting and a trial run was
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performed in November 1999 to ensure the
system would work. The system was in
operation for two days prior to the rollover
through three days after the rollover (EPRI
1999). Success of the system was hard to
judge due to early Internet problems limiting
access during the initial rollovers, a lack of
detailed data being provided by participants,
and a lack of Y2k issues early in its operation
causing users to lose interest. Also, the
database was expected to be a critical resource
should things have gone badly, since this was
not the case, use of the database for emergency
response did not occur so the effectiveness of
this decision support resource could not be
determined. Finally, had Y2K caused major
problems it is likely the system would not have
met its objectives primarily due to contributors
not having time to complete and submit the
detailed templates, a failure of the
communications component of the EIS.
Y2K Early Warning System (YEWS)
The IAEA and the NRC created the
YEWS special reporting system so that
rollover information from nuclear plants in
Japan and Korea in particular as well as other
eastern time zone plants in Europe and North
America could provide information on specific
equipment and systems. A subset of this
system was setup by specific owners groups to
monitor plants similar to specific United States
plants so that they could provide detailed
analysis from the rollover. YEWS used the
Nuclear Reporting System, which is a highly
reliable,
secure,
and
dedicated
communications system used to report nuclear
plant issues.
Additionally, YEWS used
standard terminology instead of templates for
reporting issues and status. Key equipment
and systems were identified during the
summer of 1999 so that a database and
information templates could be created and
practiced prior to the rollover. Training and
practice with the system was accomplished
during the fall of 1999. Owners group
information was generated by teams placed at
key nuclear sites that were to observe the
rollover, analyze any problems, and report
recommendations and issues back to the
owners group command center for distribution
to potentially affected plants. Success of this
system is also hard to judge due to a lack of
Y2K issues making the system essentially
unnecessary (although reports of all well were
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sent out and used by nuclear sites). However,
it is expected that this EIS would have
performed well given the location of expert
analysts at the source of potential emergencies,
well practiced communication plan and
process, and a system interface that all users
were very familiar with.
Y2K Global Status Watch (GSW)
The International Y2K Cooperation
Center (IYCC), with the endorsement of the
United Nations, established the GSW as a
system to allow national governments to report
their situation to the public. This EIS was
used by the utility to monitor conditions in
other countries, as a multinational company
that operated power plants in many countries
owned the utility. The GSW was to be used to
assist management in making decisions for
these global affiliates should conditions
warrant emergency action.
The GSW was active prior to the
rollover and for a week afterwards with
national coordinators updating the system.
The GSW was a web and template-based
system and coordinators selected one of three
levels of infrastructure capacity: green for
normally expected capacity, amber/yellow for
reduced capacity or service when compared
with normal levels, and red for significantly
reduced capacity or service when compared
with normal levels. Additionally, the national
coordinator noted whether a service outage
was pre-planned (e.g. temporary port closure
or greater spacing of air flights as a temporary
contingency measure). A “remarks” field let
countries add substantial detail on capacity
loss, actions being taken, expected time of
resolution, etc. Each national coordinator was
given a unique user id and password to logon
to the secure GSW input page. The secure site
allowed the national coordinator to submit a
new report, view previously submitted reports
and see the reports submitted by other national
coordinators. For those countries unable to log
on to the Internet, they shared their
information via fax or phone. The public site
was hosted on several mirrored servers, New
York, San Diego, Brussels (Belgium), and
Santiago (Chile). The GSW system was
initially tested on September 9, 1999, with full
tests being conducted in November and
December 1999.

The GSW’s responsiveness varied.
During a critical period following the rollover
of Africa and Western Europe, the IYCC fell
several hours behind in posting the most up-todate information to the public web site.
Because of the high load and technical
problems, the public web site was out of date
during parts of the critical period. Several
national
coordinators
expressed
disappointment that timely information was
not available at all times. Post event analysis
determined that additional testing and training,
streamlined procedures, and resources for that
critical period could have made a difference in
this outcome.
Overall, the GSW had
approximately 750,000 hits from 31 December
1999 to 3 January 2000. The European
Commission and the South America Y2K
Forum, which hosted mirror sites of the GSW,
received 150,000 and 30,000 hits respectively.
In total the GSW received 930,000 hits from
the public.
Difficulties with wording and displays
in the country detail pages caused some
confusion. Additionally, in the rush of events
over the rollover, a reporter for a major
international news service misread reports and
distributed an incorrect story on 1 January
2000, erroneously citing significant outages in
the Gambia. IYCC staff quickly contacted the
reporter, who immediately issued a correction,
but not before other major international
organizations picked up the story. IYCC
issued a news release clarifying the Gambia
report on 2 January 2000.
Corporate Early Warning System
The utility maintained its own early
warning system using plants owned by the
parent corporation in Australia, New Zealand,
Indonesia, Turkey, Spain, United Kingdom,
and the eastern United States. This system
was a Lotus Notes template based system
using predetermined forms and systems
nomenclature. Decision support was provided
by the corporate Y2K equipment and test
database. System communications utilized a
corporate Intranet with a centrally located
database server. Reports were filed within 15
minutes of the rollover and were used by the
Y2K PMO to prepare hourly status reports on
world conditions. This system was also
practiced in November and December of 1999
with key personnel being trained on the use of
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the templates and reporting schedules. This
system worked well and was able to provide
status reports to EPRI when the EPRI early
warning system went down.
External EIS
Several external EIS were used during
Y2K that are used in the normal operation of
the utility infrastructure. These EIS include
those used to operate the transmission and
distribution systems, to coordinate generation
capacity, and to monitor nuclear generation
facilities.
These EIS have their own
communication systems, decision support,
report formats, terminology, and response
procedures. It is not the purpose of this paper
to describe these systems, only those added for
Y2K, the below EIS is the only system added
for Y2K.
NERC Y2K Information Center
The NERC Y2K Information Center
was a password protected, encrypted, Internetbased information collection system that was
added on top of normal utility emergency
response systems. The normal emergency
response systems are comprised of a hierarchy
of operations centers equipped with status and
communication systems and staffed with
operators trained to respond to system events
and emergencies. Emergency response is
practiced on a regular basis and controlled
through a set of established protocols and
emergency response procedures. The NERC
Y2K Information Center was established to
provide a central location for status and
decision support information on events caused
by Y2K failures or occurring during Y2K.
Data input was standardized with the ability to
provide narrative description maintained.
NERC limited the system to 400 designated
information providers and an expanded but
limited number of read only observers.
Additionally, a series of conference calls were
held to provide status for the rollover of each
region.
Backup communications were
provided by an emergency satellite telephone
system. The EIS was practiced through a
series of drills corresponding to April 9, 1999
(the 99th day of 1999, or 9999) and September
9, 1999 (9/9/99) rollovers.
These were
considered key dates due to 9999 being used to
indicate end of execution in Cobol programs
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and some experts had predicted possible
failures during the rollovers to these dates.
Success of the EIS was hard to judge
due to a lack of events meeting the reporting
criteria (about 13 events were reported, all
minor) resulting in little need to use the system
(NERC 1999).
Utility Y2K Rollover Reporting System/EIS
Key utility organizational units reported
status and obtained decision support during the
Y2K rollover to the Y2K Project Management
Office (PMO) using a special EIS. The EIS
included a computerized template-based
communication and data analysis system, a
dedicated conference call system, a backup
radio system, and the corporate Y2K database.
The Y2K PMO maintained an equipment
database for decision support and used it to
create a spreadsheet of mission critical assets
that was distributed as Excel 95 files to all
operating units for use in reporting, decision
support, and emergency response during the
Y2K Rollover. Additionally, the Y2K PMO
prepared a set of report templates using
Microsoft Word 95, a dictionary of standard
terminology and codes, and shared email
folders for use in the rollover reporting system.
Standard reports were generated at preset
intervals and transmitted via Microsoft
Exchange or other email systems. The reports
were: (Jennex, Burt and Barker 1999a, 1999b,
1999c)
Y2K Rollover Status Reports provided
the Y2K PMO and the Corporate Emergency
Operating Center with the operating status of
specific mission critical electric utility systems,
key facility systems and business processes
and systems, utilizing date-sensitive assets.
The reports were prepared utilizing a
Microsoft (MS) Word 95 template and
transmitted via MS Exchange or other Email
systems to the Y2K PMO 30 minutes prior to
the rollover, 30 minutes after the rollover, and
then hourly until the emergency operating
center was closed. One exception was made
for the global subsidiary. This subsidiary
utilized Lotus Notes and created their own
template-based system using the same formats
and terminology as the corporate system.
Their reports were forwarded to the corporate
system by their lead coordinator (Jennex, Burt
and Barker 1999b).
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Y2K Rollover Event Reports provided
the Y2K PMO with the specifics of any Y2K
Rollover failure events in mission critical
electric utility systems, key facilities and
business processes and systems, utilizing datesensitive assets.
Reports were prepared
utilizing a Microsoft (MS) Word 95 template
and transmitted via MS Exchange or other
Email systems to the Y2K PMO following the
determination of a suspected occurrence of a
Y2K Rollover failure event in a date-sensitive
asset (Jennex, Burt and Barker 1999b). A
copy of the general template is found in
Appendix A. Business units were expected to
tailor the template to fit their unit prior to the
rollover.
Post-Y2K Rollover Validation Testing
Status Reports provided the Y2K PMO with
coordinating and status information pertaining
to the Post-Y2K Rollover Validation Testing
of previously identified key processes and
systems. The reports utilized a Microsoft (MS)
Word 95 template and were transmitted via
MS Exchange or other Email systems to the
Y2K PMO hourly after the rollover until
testing was completed for equipment requiring
immediate verification of correct operation
and daily until testing was completed for other
equipment requiring validation (Jennex, Burt
and Barker 1999b).
Y2K Early Warning Reports prepared
by operating unit emergency response centers
other than the Y2K PMO were Email
messages with attached Word 95, Excel 95,
PDF or HTML files as necessary, and were
transmitted using internet or intranet Email to
the Y2K PMO. The Y2K PMO used these
reports as well as other Y2K Early Warning
Web Sites and prepared and distributed hourly
reports until the rollover using a Microsoft
(MS) Word 95 template and transmitted via
MS Exchange or other Email systems (Jennex,
Burt and Barker 1999b).
This system also worked well within
the limited stress caused by the rollover.
However, had the rollover resulted in an
emergency it is anticipated the system would
have quickly become burdensome to the
responders. The problem was that while the
templates were a good approach, they were too
generic and long. Shorter templates and a
more common emergency ontology would
have been much better. What is desired of an

emergency ontology is a common language
understood by all participating users. This
case found the business units changed the
templates to reflect their jargon and language
and not the common language used within the
Y2K PMO. These issues were easily sorted
out during the rollover but only because there
were few problems needing response.
Additionally, one technical issue was observed.
The EIS relied on multiple email systems to
communicate reports. Also, the system relied
on file naming conventions to keep reports
organized. While this worked well for most of
the reporting centers, one reporting center had
an interface problem that caused the files to
come through the email networks with the file
names truncated to the 8 character DOS format.
This problem was attributed to the bridge
interface between the reporting unit’s token
ring LAN and the Y2K PMO’s Ethernet LAN.
The problem was identified during the rollover
drills (discussed next) but was not able to be
corrected prior to the rollover.

EIS TRAINING DRILLS
Industry Y2K Drills
As previously mentioned, two industrywide drill dates were chosen that corresponded
to the rollover to key dates. These dates, April
9, 1999 or 9999 in Julian date/year format, and
September 9, 1999 or 9/9/99, were dates
whose numeric representations were used as
stop execution codes in Cobol programs.
April 9 Y2K Drill
An industry wide drill was conducted to
test
and
practice
Y2K
Rollover
communication systems on April 9, 1999.
Security Coordinators were required to
participate and utilities were encouraged to
participate (the subject utility was an active
participant). The purpose of the drill was to
review and test existing procedures for
handling loss of communication channels and
to test backup communication systems and
procedures.
The drill was considered a
success. Lessons learned that are important to
the study of EIS include (NERC 1999a):
•

Schedule additional training on proper
radio procedures and protocols.
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•

Schedule additional training on newly
installed satellite voice systems, radios,
and other less frequently used equipment.

•

Personnel should be provided with
fallback instructions in the event of a total
loss of communications.

•

Information should be prioritized
according to safety and system reliability
impacts to allow highest priority
information to be transferred with
available resources.

•

Using operators to manually communicate
critical information that would normally
be automatically transmitted (telemetered)
is very resource intensive with existing
capability of voice systems. Numerous
radio channels and other systems became
congested during the drill. Much of the
system monitoring data should be
considered for exception reporting only.
Another approach would be to consider
staggered reporting times.

•

Prepared checklists and job aids should be
developed and provided to operators and
field personnel. These checklists will
speed communications and provide
greater accuracy.

•

Standard naming conventions for facilities
should be reviewed and updated as
necessary. This is particularly important
on facilities on adjoining systems.

•

Phone lists should be reviewed and
updated on a continuing basis.

•

An incident tracking process and format
should be developed and implemented.

•

Personnel in remote locations must have
watches and some will need calculators.

•

Battery checks should be completed prior
to key periods and spares provided for the
maximum anticipated duration of the Y2k
transition period.

•

Arrangements should be made to respond
to requests from news media without
adversely impacting the primary mission.

•

Efforts should be made to eliminate
unnecessary noise from communications
channels. Use of communications
equipment muting capabilities and
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communicating from a quiet location will
enhance the quality of the information.
•

Signal strengths should be verified in all
critical locations and antennas adjusted as
necessary.

•

A reference document should be available
to show what priority information flows
over each communications circuits. If a
specific communications capability is lost,
the necessary information to be replaced
can be quickly identified.

•

Consideration should be given to the
longer time required to manually collect
and transmit information.

•

Consideration should be provided for
personnel with key roles who become ill.

•

Separate fax and voice lines.

•

Disable answering systems during
emergencies.

•

Cell phones were slower than anticipated
and the range of the phone service was not
adequate.

•

Schedule reporting periods to avoid
confusion.

September 9 Y2K Drill
An industry wide drill was conducted to
test
and
practice
Y2K
Rollover
communication systems on September 9, 1999.
All system operators were required to
participate and test various systems including
primary and backup communications, the
pager system, and satellite communications
systems.
Test results were positive and
indicated improvement over the April 9, 1999
drill. However, further testing, training and
protocol development were needed to improve
Satellite communications.
Also, many
organizations still needed to install satellite
systems and participate in further drills.
Additionally, further evaluation of the
Scheduling Coordinator pager system was
necessary as it took an unacceptable amount of
time for pages to be received (20 to 25 minutes
after page issuance) and some operators did
not call in as directed. Finally, it took longer
than anticipated to complete each portion of
the drill due to the nature and volume of drill
communications.
The result was that
communications for the second phase of the
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test were being received while the first phase
was being completed creating confusion for
the drill leaders (ISO 1999).
The second phase of the drill used a
variety of scenarios consisting of random lists
of data points periodically handed to the
Security Coordinators.
The Security
Coordinators were instructed that they had just
lost the respective data points and directed to
go get them through any means possible. This
was designed to simulate a real-time loss of
telemeter data. Loss of time to the issues
listed above caused this portion of the drill to
be shortened. However, it was considered
successfully completed although not all
participants were able to complete their tasks
(ISO 1999).
While effort was expended in fixing
problems found during the April 9 drill, many
of those lessons learned, particularly those
with respect to communications and reporting
protocols, were still observed to need
improvement. Lessons learned from this drill
(applicable to the study of EIS) include:
(NERC 1999b)
•

Continue training on proper radio
procedures and protocols, as well as
equipment operation (startup and channel
switching). Testing of backup
communications equipment should
continue on a regular basis. This testing
includes radios, satellite systems, and
other backup communications devices.

•

Efforts should be made to eliminate
unnecessary noise from communications
channels. Use of muting capabilities and
communicating from a quiet location will
enhance the quality of the information

•

During a time of heightened awareness
and emergencies, the flow of information
increases substantially. To allow highest
priority information to be transferred with
available resources, information should be
prioritized in advance according to safety
and system reliability impacts.

•

Routine status updates should be
broadcast using an efficient and
appropriately secure medium to those with
a need to know, rather than relying on
numerous calls to the source of
information.

•

Phone lists and satellite phone
identifications should be reviewed and
updated on a continuing basis. Lists
should be maintained in a secure manner.

•

Key operating and information centers
become overly crowded and busy during a
time of crisis. Rigorous controls are
required to assure only essential personnel
are allowed access and that all activities
are mission essential.

•

Review staffing issues. Consider the
number of people needed to staff all key
facilities and the ability to sustain staffing
for longer times, if needed. Make more
efficient use of staffs. Improve
deployment procedures.

•

Review staff management and controls,
such as criteria for personnel to report in,
criteria for release of personnel, resource
tracking. Know where personnel are and
what they are doing.

•

Review contingency and emergency
response plans with public agencies and
government.

•

Review and train criteria for reporting of
incidents, off normal conditions, etc.

•

Establish means for periodic capture of
essential data.

Utility Y2K Drills
The utility prepared its emergency
response staff to respond to potential Y2K
issues and to use the EIS through a series of
three drills/training sessions held in December
1999. The first provided training focused on
identifying roles and responsibilities of
participants, communication flow paths,
information requirements, schedules, and an
overview of the EIS. This was primarily a
classroom presentation with an extensive
question and answer period. Direction was
also provided on how the subsequent drills
would be performed. All personnel expected
to be manning emergency response centers
during the rollover attended the session
(Jennex, Burt and Barker 1999c)
The
second
session
was
a
communications drill performed one week
after the training session. This drill was to
ensure each emergency center could establish
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communications with the Y2K PMO
emergency center and send in reports in the
proper format. Reporting was done using the
expected time frame planned for the rollover.
The drill was followed by a critique that
identified problems with using naming
conventions and email transfer of files (file
names in some cases were truncated making it
hard to identify the report as mentioned
earlier), staffing issues associated with
handling a large number of reports in the Y2K
PMO, call restoration protocols, message
formatting, login issues, and proper responses
during conference calls. Follow up training
was accomplished during the following three
days and in advance of the third drill.
Computer and network configurations were
observed to be a problem and all emergency
centers were requested to do a complete Y2K
setup for the third drill. Finally, the need for a
roll over reporting guide with step-by-step
procedures was recognized and generated for
use in the third drill (Jennex, Burt and Barker
1999c).
The third drill was a full dress rehearsal.
All emergency response centers were setup
and staffed just as expected for the Y2K
rollover. The first phase of the drill allowed
each emergency response center to perform
drills for their local areas. The second phase
of the drill involved establishing full
communications with the Y2K PMO center
and then practicing the loss of each
communication system and the establishment
of each back up communication system.
Report filing was practiced on an as needed
basis with those centers needing to
demonstrate they could file reports properly.
Post drill critique was performed. Issues
identified included changing to the radio as the
first backup to the conference call rather than
the corporate phone system due to the second
phone
system
being
cumbersome.
Additionally there were still some issues with
the templates and terminology and some local
computer issues. These were resolved in
follow up training over the next few days.
Changes were made to the rollover-reporting
guide as needed and the guide was finalized
for rollover via a conference call on December
29, 1999. Follow up drills were done with
individual emergency response centers as
needed to ensure participants and sites were
ready (Jennex, Burt and Barker 1999c).
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ANALYSIS
The expanded EIS model generated
from the literature consists of database, data
analysis, normative models, an interface,
trained users, methods to communicate
between users and between users and data
sources, protocols to facilitate communication,
and processes and procedures used to guide
the response to and improve decision making
during the emergency. Due to the lack of
issues during the rollover no analysis can be
done on the effectiveness of the decision
support and database portions of the EIS.
However, the other features of the EIS can be
looked at and several lessons learned can be
identified, these are discussed below.
The major issue encountered suggests
that the expanded EIS model needs to be
expanded further.
This issue was the
integration of the various EIS. This issue was
not technical; it was caused by all the various
organizations (both internal and external)
needing to have their own data and their own
systems.
Integration was accomplished
through the central Y2K PMO center and
worked well. However, for an unscheduled
emergency this may be difficult. The nuclear
industry accomplishes this integration in much
the same way through the use of emergency
centers located at each nuclear facility. All
local organizations have desks and phone
communications and are trained together as a
team. This approach was used for Y2K and
was successful. Building the Y2K emergency
response team through the series of drills
conducted in December 1999 melded the
participants into a cohesive team. Slogans
such as “one company, one team” backed up
by shirts and other paraphernalia were
successful in overcoming group rivalries for
the duration of the event. It is recommended
that all emergency response teams that involve
multiple organizations practice regularly and
take steps to establish a team identity. The
suggestion from this is that the expanded EIS
model needs to also have an integrated
command and control structure in addition to
its other components. The recommendation is
that organizations include a central emergency
command structure.
The one technical issue identified
affects the database and communications
components of the expanded EIS model and

Emergency Response Systems: The Utility Y2K Experience

also suggests further clarification to the
expanded EIS model. This issue deals with
integrating a variety of data formats. Each
organization tended to have their own format
making it difficult to integrate data. This was
accomplished by cut and paste and it was
recognized that should Y2K have been a major
disaster, this would not have worked. It is
strongly recommended that a common
emergency data structure be adopted on a
national scale. It is expected that this will be
difficult given that the utility industry could
not do it with NERC, EPRI, and NEI each
having their own data standard and neither
being willing to change. The suggestion is
that the expanded EIS model communication
protocols need to include a standard a
emergency
data
dictionary
and
the
communication methods need to include an
emergency taxonomy. The recommendation is
that organizations create organization wide
data dictionaries for EIS data and taxonomy of
communication methods.
The literature suggests the use of
templates and common terminology for the
communication components of the EIS. This
was followed with good success.
Once
emergency response personnel were trained
the use of templates greatly alleviated message
overload and minimized communication errors.
All company senior management were fully
briefed (either in person or via fax) on the
status of the entire company within an hour of
the rollover and public relations personnel had
press reports issued within 45 minutes of the
rollover. It should be noted that a significant
training effort was needed to generate this
success. This supports the literature in its
recommendation for training. Also, without
training or with minimal training it was found
that templates could give a false sense of
knowledge as the template based reports did
not reflect what the sender was trying to say.
It should also be noted that creating templates
and common terminology is not as easy as it
seems as this case involved multiple
organizations and cultures that were very
diverse in function.
Finding a common
terminology and getting people to follow a
template that is different than their own
requires top management support and a strong
emergency manager in order to overcome
organizational
cultural
and
political
differences. Appendix A is an example of a

template used. The recommendation is that
organizations create and practice EIS data and
communication templates
Hardware and software infrastructure
aspects of the EIS were found to be
problematic with respect to getting consistent
setups. EIS equipment that is used for routine
operations when not involved in emergency
response cannot be counted on to be able to be
immediately plugged into the EIS. Setup
procedures with system settings were needed
to ensure the emergency centers could be
established quickly and integrate into the
overall EIS. These issues were identified
during the drills and again emphasize the need
for practicing and using the EIS prior to an
emergency.
The recommendation is that
organizations use dedicated EIS hardware and
software and practice EIS setup if the EIS is
not kept hot.
The expanded EIS model includes
trained users. Drills and training are crucial to
the creation of trained users and the successful
operation of an emergency center. Every Y2K
drill found issues that when resolved,
improved the performance of the emergency
team. Additionally, follow on drills found that
issues identified in the previous drill were not
always resolved satisfactorily, implying that
single drills are insufficient for training
emergency response teams. Given that many
organizations have transient workers, turnover
should be expected.
This implies that
organizations need to drill and train on a
continual basis. The recommendation is that
organizations have training schedules that
include annual full dress drills and quarterly to
semiannual table top or partial drills.
The expanded EIS model includes data
analysis, decision support, and normative
models. The Y2K EIS used contingency plans
for equipment, systems, processes, and
infrastructure failures as decision models,
decision support, and predetermined data
analysis for emergency personnel. A large
number of contingency plans were written and
practiced for Y2K and were ready to facilitate
decision-making. Also, these plans included
analysis of failures, conditions and situations
that provided predetermined assessment of
data and system responses that the EIS and
users were designed to focus on. While Y2K
did not have to utilize these plans, it should be
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noted that this effort was not wasted as it was
found during disaster recovery reviews
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks that the
Y2K contingency plans were valid for a
variety of emergencies (Jennex 2003). The
recommendation is that organizations prepare
contingency plans for all important equipment,
systems, and processes.
An EIS needs communication methods.
Y2K EIS used a variety of landlines, cell
phones,
and
Internet
based
email
communication systems. During the rollover
it was observed that cell phone and Internet
based systems seemed to have more reliability
issues than traditional systems. This was
probably due to unreasonable expectations of
cell and Internet Service Provider reliability
and the, in hindsight unreasonable, expectation
of a lower number of cell and Internet users
during the rollover. While there isn’t enough
evidence to support not using cell or Internet
based EIS, it is interesting to note that these
systems seemed to fail at critical times,
probably due to congestion caused by high
traffic. It is not unreasonable to assume that
following a disaster cell and Internet traffic
will dramatically increase due to people
outside the affected area trying to get
information while decreasing within the
affected area if phone lines are impacted by
the disaster. Also, as 9/11 illustrated, disasters
can cause communication failures as following
9/11 as the collapse of the towers damaged a
Verizon switching center resulting in the loss
of 182,000 voice circuits and 1.6 million data
lines, additionally, cell coverage was
temporarily lost (Smith 2004).
The
recommendation is that an EIS needs to
incorporate multiple communication channels
using multiple communication media.

CONCLUSIONS
Yes, Y2K was rather uneventful.
However, the lessons learned from preparing
for Y2K are valid for all potential emergencies
as all EIS and emergency response teams need
to prepare in advance in order to be effective.
This removes the concern that Y2K, being a
planned emergency, is not applicable to
unplanned emergencies. It is argued that all
emergencies are planned; otherwise the study
of EIS is a waste of time. This paper has
found that the preparation that went into Y2K
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yields insights into how any organization can
better prepare for disaster response and build
an EIS. These lessons are also considered
applicable to any industry, as none of the
issues identified in this paper are unique to the
electrical industry. The major lessons learned
are:
•

Create organization (if possible industry)
wide templates and terminology

•

Train and drill with the EIS on a periodic
basis to ensure personnel can use the EIS
and help overcome political and cultural
issues in multi-organization teams

•

Use contingency plans as a decision
model and data analysis tool

•

Either have dedicated emergency
equipment or have good setup procedures

•

Standardize data to support integration
with other EIS

•

Utilize multiple communication methods
including wired and wireless networks

•

Don’t rely solely on the reliability of the
Internet

Two major issues were identified
impeding the effective use of an EIS. First is
the integration of multiple EIS. Several issues
were
identified
impacting
integration.
Technical issues included multiple data
formats and communications methods,
specifically different email systems. However,
the most significant issues affecting
integration were political and cultural
considerations.
Organizational politics
impacted decision processes and influenced
the selection of hardware and software,
oftentimes resulting in non-optimal selections.
Additionally, the politics of data and “turf”
control resulted in multiple systems being used
for the same event as no organization was
willing to give up control of its sphere of
influence (note that the NRC and NEI had an
EIS for nuclear plants, NERC an EIS for
transmission, EPRI an EIS for conventional
power generation and distribution, and utilities
had EIS for their service areas). Most of this
is due to legal requirements placed on the
organizations and suggests that full EIS
integration will not occur until legislation
governing emergency response is changed to
allow for central control. The events of 9/11
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support this and are leading to reform with the
creation of the central Homeland Defense
department and legislation mandating common
data formats and reporting (note that much
current effort is being spent on integrating law
enforcement data systems which will lead to
better EIS integration). The final issue with
organizational culture is the formulation of a
common, emergency response ontology.
Many problems were encountered with
personnel from different organizations not
understanding the terms used by other
organizations.
Second is training. The literature reports that
an EIS not trained will not be used. This case
supports that and goes further by saying that
an EIS that is not trained may not even
function.
The value of training is in
identifying issues that would have prevented
the EIS from effective operation. Chief among
these are timing, formatting, and resource
issues. Timing of messages and activities was
found to be very optimistic and had to be
adjusted to allow EIS personnel time to

assimilate messages and make decisions.
Formatting was an issue, as it did not matter
how clear the template or procedures were,
personnel under stress make mistakes unless
they are well trained. Resource allocation was
an issue as it was done optimistically resulting
in too few personnel for assigned tasks and.
allocated equipment either didn’t work or
didn’t have needed capacity. Training proved
to be an invaluable tool for ensuring that the
EIS functioned as expected.
Finally, Y2K suggests modifications to the
expanded EIS model.
The final model
suggested by Y2K is that an EIS should
consist of a database, data analysis tools,
normative models, an interface, trained users,
methods to communicate between users and
between users and data sources, protocols to
facilitate
communication,
processes,
procedures, and contingency plans used to
guide the response to and improve decision
making during the emergency, and a central
emergency response command structure.
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APPENDIX A – Y2K ROLLOVER EVENT REPORT TEMPLATE

Note: When Form is complete, transmit to the Y2K PMO at y2kxover@sce.com
Company / BU / Organizational
Unit:
Y2K Command Center:
Facility / Center Name:
Event No.:
Event Date:
Event Time: (24 hours)
Reporting Organization:
Reporting Person:
Summary of Event:
Event Occurred in
or Involves:
System:
Equipment:
Component:
Device:
Application:

Name

MIS DB Asset ID
No.

* Tripped, Stalled, Locked up, Abended, etc.
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Current Operating Status: check
Normal Upset Tripped* Standby

Outage
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Type of Asset Involved
Device / Component
Involved:
Mainframe
Computer
UNIX Workstation
Personal Computer
CDE PC

Check

Type of Asset Involved
Device / Component
Involved:

Check

Function of Asset Involved
Function:

Check

Mainframe Computer
Services
Client Workstation
Server
Communications
Services - WAN
Communications
Services - LAN
Communications
Services - Voice
SCEnet
WEnet
Email
Internal Phone Service

Novell Server
NT Server
AIX Sever
System Software
Database System
Communications
Software
Office Systems
Software
Telephone
Pager
Mobile Radio Phone

External Phone
Service
Paging Service
Cell Phone Service
Mobile Radio Phone
Service
Intranet Services
Internet Services
Security
U.S. Postal Service
Parcel Delivery
Service
Electronic Wire
Service

Local Area Network
Cell Phone
Web Browser
Microsoft Exchange
Lotus Notes
Voice Response
Unit
FAX Machine
Application

Event Impacts:
Mitigation Actions
Taken:
Contingent
Operational Actions
Taken:
Other:
Expected Date to Return to Service:
Expected Time to Return to Service:
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